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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE GUARDIANSHIP INCOMPETENCY
STANDARD
In Pennsylvania, as in all other jurisdictions in the United
States,' legal machinery 2 exists for declaring a person 3 incompe-
tent and placing his property4 under the control of a guardian. 5
The machinery is activated upon petition by "any person in-
terested in the alleged incompetent's welfare."6 Once a person is
declared incompetent, his property is managed by a court-
supervised guardian and the incompetent is automatically placed
under certain legal disabilities.7 The predecessors8 of the current
statutory provision in Pennsylvania often have been called "pre-
ventative and protective" in nature,9 but, unfortunately, on occa-
sion they have proved to be "preventative" of one's enjoyment of
his property, and "protective" of the anticipated inheritance of
an anxious prospective heir who sees in his aging relative's ac-
celerating spending habits the danger that his ship may sink
before it can come in.
10
'See R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL IN-
COMPETENCY 144 n.1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN].
2 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5501, 5511 (1975).
3 Only persons other than minors need be declared incompetent. See Williams Es-
tate, 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 718, 722 (Phila. County Orphans' Ct. 1966). The estates of minors
are subject to guardianship under PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5101-5167 (1975).
4 A finding of incompetency may warrant the appointment of a guardian of one's
estate or person or both, depending on the circumstances. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 551 l(a) (1975). This Comment is concerned only with guardianships of the estate.
5 Other jurisdictions use synonyms for "guardian," such as "committee," "conser-
vator," "curator," "tutor," or "receiver." G. STEPHENSON, ESTATES AND TRusTs 83 (rev.
ed. 1955). For a general description of the history and nature of guardianship, see, e.g.,
Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13
WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 602-07 (1972).
6 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5511 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 15-22 infra.
8 See note 25 infra.
9See, e.g., Nagle Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 172, 210 A.2d 262, 264 (1965); Earnshaw
Appeal, 187 Pa. Super. 124, 129, 144 A.2d 480, 482 (1958); Sigel Estate, 169 Pa. Super.
425, 429, 82 A.2d 309, 311 (1951). Several other cases, however, have called the stat-
utes "dangerous." See, e.g., Myers Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 462, 150 A.2d 525, 526 (1959);
Ryman's Case, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 223, 11 A.2d 677, 683 (1940).
"0 See note 123 infra & accompanying text.
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This Comment is premised upon the assumption underlying
all civil incompetency provisions: that guardianship is a neces-
sary institution." To state the obvious case, it is desirable that
courts be empowered to appoint a guardian of the estate of a
person who suddenly loses all capacity to reason, where the in-
capacity causes the person hardship resulting from his inability
to manage his property, and where no prior legal arrangement
2
exists to cover this catastrophe.
That guardianship of a person's property is sometimes the
only reasonable course does not mean, however, that it is to be
embarked upon whenever a person seems to be having prop-
erty-management problems. The consequences of guardianship
are far too dire'3 to be unleashed lightly. 14 In Pennsylvania, the
11 For a contrary opinion see the remarks of Dr. Thomas Szasz in Current Com-
ment, Symposium on the Aging Poor, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 45, 82 (1972) (advocating "the
immediate abolition of all involuntary psychiatric interventions imposed on the aged by
the state").
12 Several alternatives are available. Depending on the nature of the estate and the
needs of the persons involved, the solution may lie in an inter vivos trust, in joint
tenancy, in a power of attorney, or in some other estate planning device. See generally
ALLEN, supra note 1, at 144-93; UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW CENTER, THE SIXTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 72.1507-.1509 (1972); Corcoran, The Revocable, Ir-
revocable Living Trust for the Incompetent Client, 110 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 96 (1971); Kal-
cheim, Legal Protection for the Aged, 20 PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1974, at 79.
13 One study of guardianship based on interviews with professionals in the field
concluded that "in spite of its protective features, appointment of a guardian is often
regarded as an unattractive solution. In fact, many of the interviewees characterized it
as a last resort, a course to be avoided if at all possible." ALLEN, supra note 1, at 150.
Although this study did not encompass Pennsylvania, the objections it raises seem to
apply with equal force to Pennsylvania guardianships.
14 All too often, the mythical talisman, "preventative and protective," is summoned
up to dispel the dark side of the deprivations of guardianship. See note 9 supra. One
author has concluded that "the very structure of [guardianship] proceedings-as well as
judicial adherence to the view that guardianship serves the ward's best interest and lack
of.sympathy for the unproductive elderly-may encourage a finding of incompetency."
Comment, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the Elderly Freedom to
Spend? 73 YALE L.J. 676, 684 (1964). Lawyers, too, are sometimes guilty of excessive
casualness in this area. In one case, an attorney described how he managed to win a
"simple custodianship of [the] property" of his client. The practitioner outlined the
facts of the case of a man who had been committed to an institution by his family:
[T]he great trouble was he was very generous. If some telephone operator was kind
to him, he would send her a big box of orchids, maybe 50 or 100 orchids.
He was spending a lot of money, but it was a trust fund of his own money,
really. The family was afraid that he would dissipate what they would eventually inherit.
And really he was no harm to himself or society, a perfectly nice guy-just
an aberration in this area.
So we brought the case to court and got him freed, just had a custodian
appointed for his property. He is, as far as I know, still loose.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW CENTER, THE SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING
72.1502 (1972) (emphasis supplied). It is certainly commendable that the lawyer won
freedom for his client, but to use the word 'just" in speaking of involuntary guardian-
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1048
incompetent must relinquish possession of his real and personal
property to his guardian, 15 who is empowered to "sell, at public
or private sale, any personal property of the [incompetent]."'"
The incompetent is "incapable of making any contract or gift or
any instrument in writing . ".."17 This provision may prevent an
incompetent from legally marrying 8 and from executing a valid
will,' 9 as well as from forming enforceable business contracts and
from making valid inter vivos gifts. An incompetent also loses
the capacity to initiate lawsuits on his own.20 After a person has
been declared incompetent, the burden shifts to him, in a peti-
tion for termination of the guardianship, 2' to show that he has
regained competence.22
Beyond the direct legal consequences, an incompetent may
suffer severe social, commercial, and psychological effects. 23 He
ship seems rather callous. It is likely that this gentleman derived pleasure, perhaps his
greatest or only pleasure, from making unexpected gifts to telephone operators and
others. To deprive him of the freedom to act on such impulses may well remove one of
his reasons for living. This case is especially unsettling in light of the lawyer's acknowl-
edgement that the motivation for the suit for commitment was to keep the potential
heirs from losing their inheritance.
Finally, it is appropriate to follow the lead of another writer on guardianship in
using the words of Justice Brandeis to point up a great danger in looking upon
guardianship as "preventative and protective": "Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent ...
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), quoted in Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the
Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL, Feb./March 1968, at 29, 33.
'5 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5521(1) (1975), incorporating the minors' es-
tates provisions of id. § 5141.
,61 d. § 5151, incorporated by id. § 5521(22).
1
7 Id. § 5524.
,1 One Pennsylvania court has stated that an incompetent's capacity to marry "may
be open to serious question ...." Urquhart Estate, No. 344 of 1964, 21 la (Chester Coun-
ty Orphans' Ct., Nov. 16, 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 431 Pa. 134, 245 A.2d 141 (1968).
19 A finding of incompetency before execution of a will raises a presumption that
the will is invalid. This presumption "can only be overcome by satisfactory evidence of
restoration of capacity." Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 360, 58 A. 665, 666 (1904);
accord, Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 339-40, 168 A. 25, 26 (1933). An adjudication of
incompetency after execution of the will, however, may be given some weight as
"proper evidence for consideration" in a will contest. Mulholland's Estate, 217 Pa. 65,
68, 66 A. 150 (1907).
'0 See PA. R. Civ. P. 2051-64.
21 "The court, upon petition and after such notice as it shall direct, may find, after
a hearing at which good cause is shown, that a person previously adjudged incompetent
has become competent." PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5517 (1975).
22 1n re Estate of Porter, 345 A.2d 171, 174 (Pa. 1975). The court noted, however,
"that this is a much lighter burden than that upon those who seek to obtain an initial
adjudication of incompetency... "Id. at 174 n.6.
23 A ruling that an individual lacks capacity in one area naturally raises the
question as to the extent to which he may lack capacity in other areas. Conse-
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is told that he is unable to handle the estate he may have ac-
cumulated through years of hard work. It is not difficult to
imagine the sense of despair, the loss of dignity, and the frustra-
tion that often must rage in the mind of one who is told that the
state's "preventative and protective" law will now relieve him of
the right to spend his own money freely.
In view of the drastic consequences of guardianship it is
crucial, in order to prevent unwarranted deprivation of indi-
vidual liberties, that the Commonwealth limit the imposition of
involuntary guardianship to those for whom it is absolutely
necessary. Whether the required limitation is presently em-
bodied in the Pennsylvania incompetency standard, either by
legislation or by judicial construction and application, is the sub-
ject of this Comment.24
I. THE STATUTORY STANDARD
The Pennsylvania incompetency standard is found in section
5501 of the Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code:
25
quently, others may be chary of dealing with him. Lack of certainty about a
person's competence may be as potent a deterrent as a determination of legal
incapacity.
Frequently the loss-or the fear of loss-of the whole bundle of civil rights
is more traumatic to the individual and his family than relinquishing financial
control.
V. LEHMANN & G. MATHIASEN, GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER
PEOPLE 13 (1963). Indeed, it has been suggested that the dread of a stigmatizing public
hearing on incompetency can be "so great that in many cases members of the family
will go to extreme lengths to avoid such embarrassment." G. STEPHENSON, supra note 5,
at 87. Furthermore, "[tihe stigma of incompetency and the loss of civil rights may lead
to further debilitation of an already marginally functioning person." Regan, supra note
5, at 607 n.204.
14 Although this Comment is limited in scope to the problems arising from the
incompetency standard and its application, several other guardianship procedures must
be thoroughly investigated if the Commonwealth is to assure its citizens that they will
not involuntarily lose control of their property except upon a showing of a strict neces-
sity and under carefully controlled procedures. Among the potential trouble areas are
lack of adequate notice to the alleged incompetent; his possible absence from the hear-
ing; denial of his right to effective counsel; improper choice of a guardian; excessive, or
abused, powers of the guardian; burdensome procedures for terminating the guardian-
ship; and improper accounting by the guardian. For a brief outline of some of these
problems, see Regan, supra note 5, at 605-09.
15 The current statutory definition of one who can be subjected to guardianship
differs from the previous one in certain substantive respects. The succession of major
changes in the definition of "incompetent" (excluding minor amendments) is as follows:
so weak in mind, that he or she is utterly unable to take care of his or her
property and is therefore liable to dissipate or lose the samt and to become the
victim of designing persons ....
Act No. 220, § 1, [1895] Pa. Laws 300 (repealed 1907).
insane or feeble-minded or epileptic, or so mentally defective that he or she
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"Incompetent" means a person who, because of infir-
mities of old age, mental illness, mental deficiency or
retardation, drug addiction or inebriety:
(1) is unable to manage his property, or is liable to
dissipate it or become the victim of designing per-
sons; or
(2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communi-
cate responsible decisions concerning his person.
26
Section 5511(a) effectuates this definition by providing that the
court "may find a person . . . to be incompetent and appoint a
guardian or guardians of his person or estate.
27
An ambiguity to be resolved at the outset is whether a find-
ing of incompetency under either paragraph (1) or (2) justifies
the appointment of a guardian of the estate. That paragraph
(1) mentions the incompetent's "property" only, while paragraph
(2) mentions only his "person," suggests that the former was
intended to be the standard for appointment of a guardian of
the estate and the latter the standard for appointment of a guar-
dian of the person. This conclusion is supported by an examina-
tion of the Uniform Probate Code, which influenced the current
Pennsylvania statute.28 The Code standard for appointment of a
guardian of the person2 9 is quite similar to paragraph (2) of the
Pennsylvania standard. That the Pennsylvania legislature did not
is unable to take care of his or her property, and in consequence thereof is lia-
ble to dissipate or lose the same, and to become the victim of designing per-
sons ....
Act No. 222, § 1, [1907] Pa. Laws 292 (repealed 1951).
a person, who, because of mental infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental
deficiency, drug addiction or inebriety, is unable to manage his property, or is
liable to dissipate it or become the victim of designing persons. It includes a
person heretofore declared to be a lunatic, an habitual drunkard, insane or
weak-minded.
Act No. 158, art. I, § 102(3) [1951] Pa. Laws 612 (repealed 1955).
a person who, because of mental infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental
deficiency, drug addiction or inebriety, is unable to manage his property, or is
liable to dissipate it or become the victim of designing persons.
Act No. 359, art. I, § 102(3) [1955] Pa. Laws 1154 (repealed 1974).
a person who, because of infirmities of old age, mental illness, mental defi-
ciency or retardation, drug addiction or inebriety:
(1) is unable to manage his property, or is liable to dissipate it or become
the victim of designing persons ....
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5501 (1975).
26 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5501 (1975).
2
1 Id. § 551 l(a); see id. § 551 l(b).
28 See Nast, Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, FIDUCIARY REV., Jan. 1975, at 1.
29 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 5-101, 5-304.
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add the words "or his property" to paragraph (2), which it could
have done easily had it intended that a finding of incompetency
under paragraph (2) justify appointment of a guardian of the
estate, is strong evidence that the legislature intended the two
paragraphs to be mutually exclusive in their application to
guardianship of the estate and of the person. For these reasons,
this Comment will consider only paragraph (1) of the statute as
bearing on the appointment of a guardian of the estate.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
INCOMPETENCY STANDARD
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania
statute in protecting against unwarranted deprivation of indi-
vidual liberties, it is important to recognize that competing in-
terests are involved. Absolute protection of individual liberties
could be readily assured by having no guardianship procedure at
all. But protection of individual liberties is not the sole objective.
To be weighed against protection of individual liberties is
society's desire to shield from catastrophe those whom it judges
unable to protect themselves. It is submitted that these compet-
ing interests will be best harmonized by recognizing as the fun-
damental principle of guardianship law the proposition that a
person cannot be deprived of control over his estate unless the
court is satisfied that a guardianship is necessary for his
benefit.30 This Comment will analyze how well the Pennsylvania
statute effectuates this benefit principle.
For purposes of analysis, the Pennsylvania incompetency
standard may be seen as a set of causes and a set of effects. To
find a person incompetent a court must find in him one of the
effects (unable to manage his property, liable to dissipate his
property, or liable to become the victim of designing persons) as
a result of one of the causes (infirmities of old age, mental ill-
ness, mental deficiency, retardation, drug addiction, or inebri-
ety). The degree to which these required effects and causes im-
plement the benefit principle is discussed below.
30 The courts have generally recognized this proposition. See, e.g., In re Aronson, I
Pa. D. & C.2d 638, 639 (Montgomery County C.P. 1954); In re Palmer Estate, 99 Pitt.
Legal J. 479, 483 (Allegheny County C.P. 1951). Even the state supreme court sub-
scribed to this view when it pointed out that "[a] man may do what he pleases with his
personal estate during his life. He may even beggar himself and his family if he chooses
to commit such an act of folly. When he dies, and then only, do the rights of his heirs
attach to his estate." Urquhart Estate, 431 Pa. 134, 135-36, 245 A.2d 141, 142 (1968)
(quoting Bryden's Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 636, 61 A. 250, 251 (1905)).
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A. The Causes
Deprivation of the right of an individual of sound mind to
dispose of his property as he chooses can never be for that
person's benefit. A corollary to the benefit principle, therefore,
is that a guardianship should not be imposed upon an indi-
vidual, no matter how likely it is that his particular manner of
managing his property will cause him hardship, unless the court
is convinced that the individual has not voluntarily and in sound
mind chosen to manage his property in that manner.
3'
Although the legislature has not explicitly recognized the
benefit principle, it has made a step toward effectuating this
corollary by establishing that a guardianship cannot be imposed
simply because a person does not manage his property as would
the court. The legislature has required that before a guardian-
ship may be imposed, the individual's property management
problems must result from one of several listed causes. This
causation requirement will advance the benefit principle if the
list of permissible causes is drawn and applied narrowly enough
to exempt from the guardianship laws individuals who, in sound
mind, have voluntarily chosen to manage their property in the
allegedly incompetent manner.3 2 Whether the list of causes has
been so drawn and applied is the subject of the following discus-
sion.
1. Infirmities of Old Age
Although the first listed cause, "infirmities of old age,"
might be construed as a euphemism for senility, such was not the
legislative intent. A more accurate construction is "mental or
physical infirmities of old age." Prior to 1974 the statute listed
"mental infirmities of old age" as a cause. 33 The new version,
which deleted the word "mental," "clearly includes. . . those who
are mentally sound but unable to care for themselves because of
an accident oir for any other reason.
'3 4
The legislature's decision to permit the appointment of a
guardian of the estate of a nonconsenting elderly person who
suffers from only physical infirmities undoubtedly was made
with good intentions. The purposes were probably to reduce the
stigma that attaches to a finding of incompetency, 35 and to make
31 See text accompanying note 82 infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 65-79 infra.
33 Note 25 supra.
'4 Current Legislation, FIDUCIARY REV., Jan. 1975, at 4.
35 "As so defined the word 'incompetent' may have less stigma attached to it." Id.
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the court's protection of property available to a wider range of
persons than in the past.36 Notwithstanding the nobility of the
legislative intention, however, the advisability of adding physical
infirmities to the causes of incompetence is subject to serious
question. First, does the amended definition really achieve its
purposes? Will an elderly person really be less stigmatized by the
incompetency label simply because the determination may have
been based on physical, rather than on mental difficulties?
Common sense would indicate that the finding itself bears the
stigma. How likely is it that one's neighbors and business as-
sociates are attuned to such subtleties as the omission of the
word "mental" from one branch of the state's definition of "in-
competent"? If reduction of stigma is a major purpose of the
change, a more effective measure would be to change the label
from "incompetent" to, for example, "protected person '3 7 or
"conservatee,"38 or some other more neutral term. 39
Second, one must question the advisability of widening the
categories of persons for whom involuntary guardianship is
"available." Of course, guardianship might be a very welcome
solution to the property-management problems of, for example,
a consenting quadraplegic whose mind is alert.4" But, to make
physical incapacity a ground for involuntary guardianship is an
unnecessarily broad and dangerous expansion of the definition
of "incompetent."
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which it would be
desirable for a court to impose a guardianship on the estate of
an unconsenting, physically disabled person. If such a person
wants a guardian, he will consent. If he does not want a guard-
36 "Mhe amendment to the definition of incompetent may encourage a greater
employment of guardianship where it can serve a purpose ...." FIDUCIARY REv., Apr.
1975, at 4. The inclusion of physical incapacity as a ground for incompetency generally
seems to have these two purposes. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 5, at 605; Comment,
Guardianship of Property of Incompetents, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 535, 542 (1974).
3 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-101(3).
38 See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 77.01 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
39 The term "incompetency" was condemned by one interviewee in an incompe-
tency study as follows: "I would suggest abandoning the term 'competency.' If you tell
someone he is incompetent, he is insulted, humiliated, and cannot accept it. On the
other hand, you can often convince a patient that it is to his advantage to have someone
made responsible for the protection of his person and property." ALLEN, supra note 1,
at 37.
The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra, re-
places "incompetent" with "disabled person."
40 See Grim Estate, 89 Montgomery County L. Rptr. 173 (Orphans' Ct. 1968) (de-
cided under earlier statute in which the definition of "incompetent!' did not include
those with purely physical incapacities).
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ian, then either he has correctly concluded that he can manage
his property without a guardian's assistance, 41 or he has incor-
rectly, or foolishly, decided that he does not need such help.
Only in the latter situation can an argument be made that the
guardianship should be imposed involuntarily. If the decision is
irrational, the person is conceivably suffering from a mental in-
firmity sufficient to permit adjudging him incompetent under
the old standard. But, if the decision is merely foolish, the ben-
efit principle would be violated by imposing an involuntary
guardianship because, by hypothesis, the individual is of sound
mind and has voluntarily chosen a method of property man-
agement. Non-disabled persons make foolish decisions about
their property every day, without risking loss of its control. Why,
then, should a person who is physically handicapped but men-
tally alert lose the right to make similar mistakes? 42 In sum, the
statute's purpose of making guardianship available to more per-
sons is laudable, but the added protection of consent should be
added where the disability is solely physical.
43
Finally, the term "infirmities of old age" must be questioned
for singling out "old age." If the missing consent requirement
were added, "infirmities of old age" would not be an improper
ground 44 for appointing a guardian; but still one is forced to ask
what "old age" adds to the definition. If a young person and an
old person suffer identical infirmities, should guardianship be
available only to the old person?45 If the statute is truly "preven-
41 "No matter how far a person may be incapacitated he can manage his property
and care for himself by an agent or servants if his mind is unimpaired." MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 196, Comment, quoted in Note, Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45
IOWA L. REV. 360, 367 n.45 (1960).
42 See note 108 infra & accompanying text.
4' Such is now the law in some jurisdictions. For example, Ohio law provides: "If a
person is incompetent due to physical disability, the consent of the incompetent must
first be obtained before the appointment of a guardian for him ...." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2111.02 (Anderson 1968). The statute permitting appointment of a guardian
for an unconsenting, physically disabled person was held to violate the Ohio constitution
in Schafer v. Hailer, 108 Ohio St. 322, 140 N.E. 517 (1923). Cf. In re Guardianship of
Irvine, 72 Ohio App. 405, 52 N.E.2d 536 (1943) (where the incapacity is purely physi-
cal, the consent of the incompetent must be given in writing in open court). But see In re
Guardianship of Schmidt, 221 Ore. 535, 352 P.2d 152 (1960) (a guardian may constitu-
tionally be appointed for a person who is physically incapacitated and incapable of
managing his estate).
The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra, pre-
cludes involuntary imposition of a guardianship upon the estate of a person whose
disability is purely physical.
44 The unmodified phrase, "old age," has been criticized as a ground for incompe-
tency where consent is not required. See Dewey, Civil Incompetency in Ohio: Determination
and Effect, 34 U. CIN. L. REV. 419, 423 (1965).
15 There may be problems of constitutional dimension here. First, if one views
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tative and protective" in nature,46 the phrase "infirmities of old
age" should be replaced by "mental or physical infirmities," pro-
vided that the requirement of consent is added when the infir-
mities are only physical.
2. Mental Illness, Mental Deficiency
and Mental Retardation
The next three causes listed-mental illness, mental defi-
ciency, and mental retardation-do not share the defect of the
"physical infirmities of old age" provision: A finding that an
individual is mentally ill, or deficient, or retarded, and that such
condition has caused what the court perceives to be an inability
to manage his property, is strong evidence that the individual
has not voluntarily and in sound mind chosen his course of
management. It is doubtful that the legislature could accomplish
the protection of voluntary choice with a narrower standard.
The potential difficulty with these causes lies in their application.
In order to effectuate the benefit principle, the courts must
adhere scrupulously to the requirement that a definite, debilitat-
ing mental illness, deficiency, or retardation be found before one
is declared incompetent. Happily, the courts have properly ap-
plied this requirement.
In Myers Estate,48 for example, the state supreme court af-
firmed a finding of incompetence where the subject's own tes-
timony had shown him to be "forgetful, disoriented, confused
guardianship as "good for" the incompetent, it must be asked why it should be made
available only to those who suffer from "infirmities" and are "old." If it is because the
young may recover, that does not explain the disparity of treatment: when recovery
comes, the guardianship can be terminated. The more important question arises, how-
ever, when one takes the realistic approach that guardianship is a last resort with atten-
dant oppressive consequences for the incompetent. Then it must be asked why an "old"
person must suffer those consequences, whereas a "young" person with identical infir-
mities need not suffer them. Although age has not yet been recognized as a "suspect
classification" for federal equal protection purposes, the immutability of old age and the
stigma currently associated with it are two factors that suggest that it should be on a par
with race, alienage, and national origin. For a discussion of the constitutional implica-
tions of classifications based on old age, see Debate Between H. Eglit and L. Waldman
& N. Levine, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitutional? 1 Civ. LIB. REv., Fall 1974, at 87.
4' See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
47 The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra,
incorporates this suggested modification.
At least one state has abandoned all specific requirements that any particular in-
firmities, mental or physical, be found: "An incompetent is a person judicially declared
to be incapable of managing his affairs." N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.9
(McKinney 1967). Presumably, however, the word "incapable" in this statute must be
construed to include some element of mental incapacity.
48 395 Pa. 459, 150 A.2d 525 (1959).
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and . . .susceptible to suggestion . . . . 49The testimony of the
83-year-old Dr. Myers indicated his failure to recognize his own
doctor, to remember signing a trust agreement, and to re-
member the names of his attorneys. Other mental lapses were
evidenced by his behavior in court and on the witness stand.
50
Although the trial court's observation of Dr. Myers was "fortified
by the opinions of two disinterested and qualified physicians,
' 5 1
the supreme court noted that "[b]y far the most significant evi-
dence of record is Dr. Myers own testimony. '52 The trial court
obviously based its finding of lack of mental capacity on substan-
tial relevant evidence. By following this example the courts can
help to implement the benefit principle and thereby protect in-
dividual liberties from unwarranted intrusions.53 Nevertheless,
the danger of mistake in borderline cases makes it desirable for
the courts to require, rather than merely permit, the testimony
of disinterested psychiatrists on the issue of mental condition.
54
The third cause in the "mental" trilogy, retardation, proba-
bly did not need to be added to the definition. 55 This ground
may have been added because of cases such as In re Ferraro ,56
where a petition for guardianship was denied, the court noting a
physician's testimony that the subject was "retarded, rather than
incompetent. '57 Later, however, the court more correctly de-
scribed the situation: "[W]e find no proof that she is retarded to
the degree of incompetence. '58 Furthermore, the court noted
that the alleged incompetent "is regularly employed, manages
49Id. at 468, 150 A.2d at 529.50 Id. at 467-68, 150 A.2d at 529.
51 Id. at 468, 150 A.2d at 529.
52 Id. at 467, 150 A.2d at 528.
53 For other cases where the courts have based their findings of incompetency on
the proper quality of evidence of mental trouble, see Refior Case, 160 Pa. Super. 305,
50 A.2d 523 (1947); Arthur's Case, 136 Pa. Super. 261, 7 A.2d 55 (1939); In re Estate
of Ochs, 27 Northumberland L.J. 131 (C.P. 1955).
54 See Comment, supra note 14, at 685-86. The proper role of psychiatric testimony
in incompetency proceedings is a matter of some debate. One author has concluded
that psychiatrists really serve a para-legal function, that their medical training does not
contribute significantly to their ability to diagnose mental problems, and that their use-
fulness as expert witnesses at competency hearings should therefore be questioned.
Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A
Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 564
(1963). For a more appreciative view of the role of psychiatrists see Mezer & Rheingold,
The Role of the Psychiatrist in Mental Competency Cases, 9 PRAc. LAW, Jan. 1963, at 85.
-5 Retardation was added to the definition by the 1974 amendment. See note 25
supra.
11 63 Berks County L. J. 177 (C.P. 1972).
57 Id. at 179.
5 8 Id. at 180.
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her own affairs within her limitations and saves her money. She
is in no danger of dissipating or losing any of it. '' 59 The facts of
this case did not justify declaring this person incompetent,
whether or not retardation was included in the statutory defini-
tion. If a retarded person does have such mental and functional
problems as to require a guardian, his situation can be dealt with
adequately by the general statutory standard. The danger always
exists that if new categories such as this are added, they may
sweep in persons who come within their description, but who do
not strictly meet the general standards. If the addition of retar-
dation as a ground means that the allged incompetent in Ferraro
would have been declared incompetent, the ground should be
dropped from the statute.
60
3. Drug Addiction and Inebriety
The last two causes listed, drug addiction and inebriety, pre-
sent a curious problem. No Pennsylvania case has based a find-
ing of incompetency on either of these grounds, and similar
non-use of such provisions seems to be the norm in at least one
other jurisdiction.6 1 Certainly, if alcohol or drugs so affect a
person's mind that he loses his power of rational choice, inter-
vention would be justified even without these statutory causes
because the individual would likely fall within one of the "men-
tal" categories. 62 However, declaring a person incompetent be-
cause of property-management problems caused solely by al-
cohol or drug abuse, with no intermediate finding of mental
disorder, would violate the benefit principle for the same
reasons as would a finding of incompetency based on a physical
disability alone.6 3 A person of sound mind who voluntarily
chooses to drink or take drugs, and consequently mismanages
59Id.
60 The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra,
deletes retardation as a separate ground for incompetence.
61 A study of incompetency in the District of Columbia reported that no cases had
been found arising under the alcoholism or drug addiction provisions of the statute in
that jurisdiction. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 202.
62 One study found that
[t]he view was frequently expressed by psychiatrists and psychologists that
chronic alcoholism may exist which is not accompanied by brain damage and
that this does not result in incompetency .... Thus, a finding of incompetency
based on alcoholism without a finding of mental disability would appear to be
subject to the same objection as a finding, without conseht, based on physical
disability.
Dewey, supra note 44, at 423-24 (footnote omitted).63 See notes 40-43 supra & accompanying text.
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his property, should no more be declared incompetent than
should a person who directly chooses, out of laziness or indiffer-
ence, to let his affairs go to ruin. Neither suffers from the inabil-
ity to make a rational choice which alone justifies the conclusion
that a guardianship would be to the individual's benefit. In-
clusion of drug addiction and inebriety in the statute, therefore,
serves no valid purpose.
6 4
4. The Requirement of a Causal Link
The mere concurrence of one of the statutory "causes" and
one of the statutory property-management "effects" is not, of
course, sufficient to justify imposing a guardianship under the
benefit principle. In the absence of a direct causal relationship
between the two findings, the coincidence of a statutory "cause"
and "effect" gives no more justification for state interference
than where a mentally fit person is unable to manage his own
affairs. The language of the statute itself requires that the per-
ceived inability to manage property be "because of" a specified
statutory condition.65
Some reported opinions raise concern, however, that this
basic causal requirement may be overlooked by judges who are
presented with evidence that an alleged incompetent is unable to
manage his property and with evidence that the alleged incom-
petent is mentally ill, mentally deficient, or retarded. In Sigel
Estate,nn for exaniple, the evidence quite clearly established that
Mrs. Sigel was suffering from an acute paranoid psychosis that
caused her to believe she was being pursued by killers with
atomic rays, and to protect herself by lining the windows of her
house with lead sheets and by buying a geiger counter to detect
the rays' presence. Although the analysis is clouded somewhat
because the alleged "effect" was the nebulous "victim of design-
ing persons" provision, 67 the court did not articulate adequate
reasons for concluding that the mental illness-the delusions
Mrs. Sigel was suffering-would cause Mrs. Sigel to become the
victim of designing persons.
Victimization by designing persons must mean something
more than merely spending money on "unneeded" items;
otherwise nearly everyone would fit within the category. Yet the
64 The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra,
deletes drug addiction and inebriety as independent grounds for incompetence.
65 Text accompanying note 26 supra.
66 169 Pa. Super. 425, 82 A.2d 309 (1951).
67 See text accompanying notes 113-19 infra.
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court made no finding of a mental problem affecting Mrs. Sigel's
capacity to handle money, to remember past business dealings,
to deal at arm's length, or to distinguish designing persons from
others and consequently avoid the designing ones. There was no
evidence that she would waste an undue amount of money on
protective items, or that she would purchase them, if at all, from
other than reputable, non-"designing" persons. In the absence of
such evidence it is hard to see a causal link between Mrs. Sigel's
conceded mental problem and the likelihood she would become
the "victim" of designing persons.
The finding of a causal link between a perceived mental
condition and a perceived property-management problem is es-
sential in order to protect against unjustified deprivations of
individual liberties resulting from imposition of guardianships
where the link is not present. The problem suggested by Sigel
Estate could be averted by amending the statute to require a
more definite causal link-one that is not likely to be overlooked
by the courts, and one that requires a definite finding that a
mental problem actually and substantially affects processes bear-
ing upon the alleged incompetent's property-management abil-
ity.
One solution would be for the statutory provision for the
appointment of a guardian of the estate to incorporate a formu-
lation analogous to the Model Penal Code provision on the men-
tal defect that amounts to lack of legal responsibility.68 The fol-
lowing suggested addition to section 5511 of the Decedents,
Estates and Fiduciaries Code,69 the provision empowering a
court to appoint a guardian for the estate of an "incompetent,"
emphasizes the causal link requirement:
Provided that no person's estate shall be placed under
guardianship without his consent unless at the time of
the hearing as a result of mental infirmities, mental ill-
ness, or mental deficiency he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the harmful character of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
his own well-being.
70
68 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
69 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5511 (1975).
70 A proposed revision of sections 5501 and 5511 of the Decedents, Estates and
Fiduciaries Code, PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5501, 5511 (1975), incorporating
all the changes recommended in this Comment, is set forth in full in note 151 infra.
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The American Law Institute formulation for criminal re-
sponsibility7 was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Brawner.72 Judge
Leventhal discussed at length the problem of ascertaining legal
responsibility where the defendant is mentally afflicted. He
noted the conflict between the need for expert medical tes-
timony and the "hazards in allowing experts to testify in pre-
cisely or even substantially the terms of the ultimate issue .... ,,73
The opinion pointed out'the need for the court "to see to it that
the jury in an insanity case is informed of the expert's underly-
ing reasons and approach, and is not confronted with ultimate
opinions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."' 74 The court's concern that
the question of causality be directly and fully explained is evi-
denced by its decision to "permit testimony by the expert, and
cross-examination, on the causal relationship between the mental
disease and the existence of substantial capacity for control (and
knowledge) .. . .,75The experts are to testify on the existence of
mental illness and on causality, but not on the ultimate issue of
legal responsibility, because the ultimate issue has ethical and
moral implications which the factfinder must decide. Otherwise,
the factfinder may be "influenced significantly by ... testimony
of expert witnesses really reflecting ethical and legal judgments
rather than a conclusion within the witnesses' particular ex-
pertise.
76
71 Note 68 supra.
72 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
73 Id. at 979 (quoting Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(en banc)).
74 Id. at 1006. See generally Leifer, supra note 86. Dr. Thomas Szasz takes a more
radical view of the role of psychiatrists in this area than does Dr. Leifer:
[S]o long as we allow doctors to play a leading role in the involuntary psychiat-
ric management of others, ...we can expect only tragedies .... The first
thing we should do is get rid of the doctors. The problem of dealing with the
aged is a commonsense social problem; it is not a medical problem ....
Current Comment, supra note 11, at 84. Professor Dershowitz takes a similar view:
[N]o legal rule should ever be phrased in medical terms; . . .no legal decision
should ever be turned over to the psychiatrist; . . .there is no such thing as a
legal issue which cannot-and should not-be phrased in, terms familiar to
lawyers. And civil commitment of the mentally ill ... is a legal issue. Whenever
compulsion is used or freedom denied .. .the issue becomes a legal one, and
lawyers must be quick to immerse themselves in it.
Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24,
47 (1970). For a more appreciative view of the role of psychiatrists, see Mezer & Rhein-
gold, supra note 54, at 85.
7- 471 F.2d at 1006-07.
76 Id. at 983. In Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339
A.2d 764, the court criticized a civil commitment statute which "has asked too much of
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The Brawner solution would be an apt one in the incompe-
tency context. If a person with no mental defect causally re-
lated to capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct is
responsible enough to be convicted of a crime, then one with no
mental defect causally related to his apparent inability to manage
property is responsible enough to retain control over his prop-
erty and to suffer the consequences. Management of one's own
property may have the stature of a "fundamental right.17 7 In
another context, Justice Brennan noted the finding by 49 states
that eighteen-year-olds are criminally responsible for their ac-
tions, and reasoned that they should not be denied the funda-
mental right to vote, because "differences in maturity and intel-
ligence between 18-year-olds and persons 21 years of age and
over are [found to be] too trivial to warrant specialized treatment
for any of the former class in the critically important matter of
criminal responsibility. 7 8 Likewise, if one is found to possess the
requisite mental capacity to be responsible for his criminal acts,
he should not be deprived of the important right to manage his
own affairs. Furthermore, adopting the Brawner standard for
this area would have an additional positive effect. Psychiatrists
would probably be less likely to disagree with each other than
they presently do79 if opinions were restricted to the existence of
a mental defect and its causal relationship to inability to manage
property; the external, non-medical judgments as to desirability
of guardianship would be less likely to enter into their testimony.
B. The Effects
1. Unable to Manage His Property
The first of the three statutory effects, a finding of one of
which is a condition precedent to appointment of a guardian, is
that an individual be "unable to manage his property." In requir-
psychiatrists. The psychiatrist is not merely asked to report his diagnosis and evaluation
to the court, he is asked to draw legal conclusions-is the subject mentally ill and does
he need confinement? These conclusions have severe legal consequences and should be
answered by the judicial system." Id. at 182, 339 A.2d at 778.
77 See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968).
78 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 243 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (footnote
omitted).
79 "(ln the great majority of cases psychiatrists of equal qualification and experi-
ence will reach diametrically opposed conclusions on the same behavioral evidence."
Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 216, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct.
1963). But see Comment, "Civil Insanity": The New York Treatment of the Issue of Mental
Incapacity in Non-Criminal Cases, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 76 (1958).
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ing an inability to manage property as opposed to a mere failure
to handle it properly, the statute makes clear that individuals
who mismanage their property because of laziness, indifference,
or some other voluntary force are outside the scope of the law.
The inability requirement, if properly applied, should protect
against unwarranted invasions of individual liberties.
If guardianship law is to conform to the benefit principle, °
appointment of a guardian must be preceded by a determination
that the individual will be better off with a guardian than he
would be without one. This determination must inevitably in-
volve a balancing process, because the imposition of a guardian-
ship will ordinarily make the individual worse off in some re-
spects than he would otherwise be, due to its severe social and
psychological effects.81 Absent the consent of the alleged incom-
petent, the fact that a guardianship will place his property in
more capable hands is not sufficient to outweigh the psychologi-
cal costs of guardianship. Rather, to establish the requisite net
benefit it must be shown that absent a guardianship the alleged
incompetent will suffer actual hardship significant enough to
outweigh the social and psychological harm likely to accrue from
imposition of the guardianship. Only then can it be said that the
guardianship is imposed for the benefit of the alleged incompe-
tent.
A second corollary to the benefit principle emerges from
this discussion: 82 A guardian should be appointed only upon a
finding of a significant potentiality of actual hardship to the
alleged incompetent in the absence of a guardian. The Pennsyl-
vania statute contains no explicit hardship requirement, and at
times the courts have not been sufficiently vigilant in insisting
upon a showing of hardship before imposing a guardianship.
The alleged incompetent's management derelictions often have
been of a minor sort, and have been seized upon to fill in the
statutorily required element of effect.
For example, an examination of the opinion affirming a
declaration of incompetency in Coulter Estate3 reveals that the
only evidence of inability to manage property was: (1) that Mr.
Coulter had previously requested a guardian, at that time aver-
ring that he was unable to manage his property; and (2) a letter
in evidence indicating that the director of his nursing home had
80 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
81 See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
82 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
8' 406 Pa. 402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962).
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influenced Mr. Coulter "in connection with the disposition of
certain property .... -84 The first bit of evidence should not be
persuasive at the time of trial: 85 Mr. Coulter would not have
contested the petition if he had wanted the guardianship im-
posed at that time. The second item of evidence is very thin as
well. That Mr. Coulter had been influenced to dispose of some
unspecified quantity of property is totally lacking in weight. By
that standard, anyone who yields to a salesman's pitch or to a
charity's urgings could be called incompetent.
The courts have often reached more justifiable results, how-
ever. In In re Estate of Ochs,8 6 a guardianship was imposed on the
estate of a woman who would buy excessive amounts of food,
only to let it spoil; would lose money; and did not know whether
rent due her had been paid. These deficiencies are extraordi-
nary, and their continuance could clearly lead to hardship for
the alleged incompetent. The petition was properly granted. In
Refior Case8 7 a man was declared incompetent who "could not
conduct or understand small and ordinary business affairs, such
as the bills rendered for his meals, or use of the telephone,
etc."88 Again, such problems show a concrete need for guardian-
ship. When a person cannot understand the simplest business
affairs, because of a mental problem, the state justifiably may
interfere on his behalf to prevent the financial and physical di-
saster that clearly could befall him under the circumstances.
In Colt's Case"9 the alleged incompetent "had transferred the
whole of his personal property, recently acquired by inheritance,
in exchange for an interest in a manufacturing corporation of
which he had no knowledge whatever. He knew neither the
value of the stock he was to receive, how much he was to get, nor
how much he was to pay for it."90 In Quinn Estate9 there was
evidence that Ms. Quinn made no attempt to clean up her
house; that she often unjustifiably denied having received her
welfare checks; that the house's plumbing was inoperative; and
that she had several sets of outstanding bills that she was appar-
ently planning to ignore.
84 Id. at 409, 178 A.2d at 745-46.
85 The operative time for gauging competency is the time of trial, although evi-
dence of conduct prior to trial is relevant. See, e.g., Hudak Appeal, 170 Pa. Super. 74,
77, 84 A.2d 226, 228 (1951).
86 27 Northumberland Legal J. 131 (C.P. 1955).
87 160 Pa. Super. 305, 50 A.2d 523 (1947).
8 8 Id. at 313, 50 A.2d at 527.
89 215 Pa. 333, 64 A. 597 (1906).
90 Id. at 335, 64 A. at 598.
91 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 405 (Phila. County Orphans' Ct. 1971).
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One is left, then, with two sets of cases--one where the
inability to manage property, in conjunction with the requisite
lack of mental capacity and causal link, justifies a declaration of
incompetency, and another where it does not. The problem is to
distill a viable, objective guideline for the courts to follow so that
they will always reach a proper result, and never interfere with
the property rights of those who actually manage their property
adequately.
If the approach used is to define, or categorize, the types or
degrees of property-handling derelictions that will justify in-
voluntary guardianship, the task seems impossible, short of plac-
ing the alleged incompetent in a program that can measure his
property-handling ability by directly observed, objective stan-
dards.92 A more fruitful approach is to realize that it is not the
abstract inability to manage property but rather the effect of that
inability, which is the evil sought to be cured by the statute. A
person may be a blithering, drunken idiot who doesn't know a
dollar bill from a Kleenex; but, if his economic needs are being
adequately satisfied, he should be permitted to blither in un-
molested bliss.93
It is, therefore, suggested that the statutory definition be
narrowed, not by altering the "unable to manage property"
standard, but by requiring, in the absence of informed, effective
consent by the alleged incompetent, that the court not impose a
guardianship unless it finds that the alleged incompetent will
suffer actual hardship if no guardian is appointed.
For several possible reasons a person may be technically in-
competent but still may not need a guardian of his estate. He
may have little or no property in his estate. His property may be
protected by a spendthrift trust. He may have an agent who has
been handling his affairs adequately. His property problems may
not be such as will ever cause him any hardship.
Two of these factors were present in Ex parte v. Gunn,94
where the court noted the existence of a spendthrift trust, and
observed that, "at the present time [the alleged incompetent]
seems entirely capable of managing this comparatively small sum
of money . . . -95 The court realized the potentially dangerous
92 For an example of a program that does directly gauge and supervise recovery of
property-handling ability, see the description of the Veterans Administration program
in ALLEN, supra note 1, at 129-42. See also In re Kloman, 315 A.2d 830 (Mun. App. D.C.
1974).
93 See notes 106-12 infra & accompanying text.
94 65 Montgomery County L. Rptr. 167 (C.P. 1949).
95Id. at 168. The sum involved ranged from $1,200 to $1,500 per year.
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nature of the law, and was unwilling to impose guardianship
where it was not needed. Similarly in In re Aronson,96 in which
the court declined to issue a decree of incompetency, no substan-
tial amount of property was in danger. The Aronson court stated
a principle that is fundamental in guardianship cases, but is too
often ignored:
To take from an individual the control of his or her
property is a high-handed and drastic thing to do and
.. it should not be done unless the court is well-
satisfied that it is necessary for the benefit of the alleged
incompetent and the preservation of his or her estate.
97
A third factor-the existence of an agent to handle the
subject's affairs-led the court in Korell Estate98 to conclude that
there was "no real and sufficient purpose" 99 to declare the sub-
ject incompetent, because a trustee was already handling his af-
fairs adequately. In Streda Estate'00 the court dismissed the peti-
tion, noting as one factor bearing on its decision that the alleged
incompetent "expressed confidence that his wife was well able to
handle all financial transactions on his behalf .... -101 In Denner
v. Beyer,' 0 2 although the court based its decision upon peti-
tioner's failure to prove mental incapacity, a competent person
was exercising a power of attorney on behalf of the alleged in-
competent. A court should be required to determine whether
such an arrangement exists; if it does, then normally a guardian
need not be appointed.
One apparent problem with respect to such a delegation of
business responsibility was addressed in Wood Appeal:10 3
[T]o conclude, from the fact that Mrs. Dean has dele-
gated the conduct of all her important business affairs
to others, that she does not need a guardian of her
estate, is to beg the basic question involved, because
unless she has mental capacity to manage her affairs
herself she lacks the ability to appoint agents to do it for
her. The derived authority in her agents cannot mount
96 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 638 (Montgomery County C.P. 1954).
97 Id. at 639.
98 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 318 (Bucks County Orphans' Ct. 1970).
99 Id. at 320.
100 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 523 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1957).
101 Id. at 525.
102 352 Pa. 386, 42 A.2d 747 (1945).
103 167 Pa. Super. 92, 74 A.2d 528 (1950).
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higher than her capacity to delegate such authority to
them.a"4
This problem should not be relevant to determining
whether a guardian should be appointed. First, the statutory
definition requires an effect-an inability to manage one's estate,
or at least a likelihood of dissipation or victimization. If a compe-
tent agent were handling the alleged incompetent's affairs, such
a showing presumably could not be made and the principal
would not, therefore, be legally incompetent. Even if the agent
did not have legal authority to act, as long as he acted in fact, the
principal's affairs would be handled adequately, and guardian-
ship would not be justified. If the agent ceased to act, then
guardianship might become justified if no other equivalent ar-
rangement could be established. The main point is that ap-
pointment of a guardian should not turn on the legal authority
of the agent to act.105 In the case of a spendthrift trust or a
power of attorney created before incompetency, and expressly
designed to survive during incompetency of the principal, no
such problems arise.
In light of these less drastic alternatives to guardianship, a
court should, as some have done on their own initiative, con-
strue the incompetency standard to require a showing that the
alleged incompetent is unable to manage his property and is un-
able to have his property adequately managed for him. A court
should inquire whether the person's property is being managed
properly so as to meet the alleged incompetent's needs, but
should not concern itself with who is doing the managing. Many
104 Id. at 100, 74 A.2d.at 541.
105 See UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW CENTER, THE SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
ESTATE PLANNING 72.1507 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Wormser of the New York Bar,
moderator of the panel discussion on planning for protection of incompetents): "I sup-
pose from one point of view the minute you are truly incompetent the power [of
attorney] is no good, but banks seem to rely on the fact that you aren't incompetent
until you are declared so."
A 1974 statute may remove the danger that an attorney-in-fact in Pennsylvania will
be found to have exceeded his authority in such a situation. The new law provides:
The death, disability, or incompetence of any principal who has executed a
power of attorney in writing, shall not revoke or terminate the agency as to the
attorney in fact, agent or other person who, without actual knowledge of the
death, disability, or incompetency of the principal, acts in good faith in reliance
upon the power of attorney or agency. Any action so taken, unless otherwise
invalid or unenforceable, shall bind the principal and his heirs, legatees, de-
visees, and personal representative.
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5602(a) (1975). Although it is not entirely clear
whether "incompetence" means actual incompetence or adjudicated incompetence, it is
urged that the latter should be the proper reading.
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perfectly competent persons use agents for convenience; they
are not thereby considered incompetent, or unable to manage
their property. The method of management they have chosen
happens to be the use of an agent. A mentally ill person whose
property is being adequately managed by an agent is, indeed,
able to "manage" his own affairs.
One court has noted that "[t]he sole objective of the
[guardianship] proceedings is the preservation of the estate for
the ward and for no one else .... "106 If that is not in fact the
case, it certainly should be. The -estate involved, by definition,
belongs to the ward. Instituting guardianship proceedings to
protect the interest of his prospective heirs, or of any other
potential recipient, cannot be justified.10 7 If the alleged incompe-
tent will not actually hurt himself, he should not be deprived of
control of his property. He should be permitted to exercise his
"right of foolishness,"'l0 8 a right that every competent person
enjoys. If an elderly man derives pleasure from surprising per-
fect strangers with exotic gifts, or from accumulating a collection
of undistinguished tubas, or from financing studies to prove the
earth is shaped like a toothbrush, he may be deriving real satis-
faction from his estate. Perhaps he feels no need to save for the
future-that he is justified in acting out a long-suppressed
dream. Entering his last years of life, he may care less about the
mundane matters of "sensible" property management. He may
wish to "live a little" while there is time.' 0 9 Whatever the motiva-
tion for his late-blooming extravagance, the standard of incom-
petency should include the requirement of a finding that he
will be harmed if no guardian is appointed. If his "foolish"
spending habits leave him with sufficient funds to live adequate-
ly, he should be left alone. The only relevant value is the welfare
of the alleged incompetent. Society may despise wastefulness,
but it should sooner condemn infringements on personal liberty.
"'In re Palmer Estate, 99 Pitt. Legal J. 479, 488 (Allegheny County C.P. 1951).
107 It might be argued that proceedings are justified where the subject's incompe-
tent property management may deprive his dependents of adequate support, but there
are sanctions against such derelictions in support law. If the dependents are being de-
prived, the state should use its support machinery to require payments, just as it would
against a competent person. It is not necessary to give the state the added weapon of
incompetency proceedings in such cases.
108 One recommendation of a symposium on these problems was that "[t]he pro-
posed statute should seek to preserve the right of foolishness to the same extent as it is
reserved to the rest of us not so unfortunate as to be labeled senile or mentally ill."
Current Comment, supra note 11, at 77.
10' See Comment, supra note 14, at 682.
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The statutory standard of incompetency should be amended
to incorporate the idea that it is the ultimate effect on the alleged
incompetent's ability to live adequately and comfortably that is
crucial, not some abstract, elusive measure of his ability to man-
age property. The following provision should be added to the
amending language to section 5511 of the Decedents, Estates
and Fiduciaries Code,110 proposed above:'
And provided further that no person's estate shall be
placed under guardianship without his consent unless
his inability to manage his property is of such a nature
and degree that substantial harm will befall him as a
direct result of such inability, and unless no other suit-
able property-management arrangement to which he
will consent is available.
1 12
This standard would permit a court to follow existing precedents
with respect to the issue of inability to manage property, but
would diminish the danger of unnecessarily imposing a guardian
on an alleged incompetent by requiring a finding of actual hard-
ship. A court probably could not find actual hardship without
first finding an inability to manage property. This modified
formulation of the first "effect" standard-inability to manage
property-would be acceptable.
2. Likelihood of Dissipation or
Victimization
The second and third of the three effects upon a finding of
one of which the statute permits the appointment of a guardian
are that the individual is liable to (1) dissipate his property, or (2)
become the victim of designing persons. These effects are unac-
ceptable as components of a statutory definition of "incompe-
tent."
First, these effects present a serious problem of reliable
proof. The statute on its face does not require a showing of past
dissipations of property but only a finding that one is "liable" to
spend his capital down to nothing. 13 It is difficult to imagine a
... PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5511 (1975).
1 " Text accompanying note 70 supra.
112 A proposed revision of sections 5501 and 5511 of the Decedents, Estates and
Fiduciaries Code, PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5501, 5511 (1975), incorporating
all the changes recommended in this Comment, is set forth in full in note 151 infra.
113 Nor have the courts read such a requirement into the statute. See Arthur's Case,
136 Pa. Super. 261, 264, 7 A.2d 55, 56-57 (1939).
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case in which it could be proved satisfactorily that a person who
has never in the past dissipated his property is, at the time of
trial, 1 4 "liable" to do so in the future. Apart from the common
sense judgment of the factfinder, the only source of information
on the likelihood of future dissipation or victimization appears to
be the expert testimony of psychiatrists. However, if psychiatric
testimony regarding past behavior is normally subject to question
because of conflicting opinions and other weaknesses," 5 its accu-
racy is even more questionable where predictions of future be-
havior are involved.
11 6
Even if the doubtful accuracy of such predictions is over-
looked, the question remains whether these two grounds are
useful additions to the incompetency definition. These standards
would be superfluous except in cases in which the alleged in-
competent is able to manage his property, but, at the same time,
is liable to dissipate it or to be victimized. Such cases might be
imagined, if inability to manage property is construed so nar-
rowly as to exclude both of the other two failings. No reason
appears, however, so to construe the property management
standard. It would be preferable to eliminate the latter two
grounds, and to read them into the broad standard of inability to
manage property. In that way, likelihood of dissipation or vic-
timization would be relevant to showing inability to manage
property, but would not be independent grounds for incompe-
tence. This result would lessen the danger that the incompetency
net would be widened to include persons who are, in fact, able to
manage their property. 17 Even though such cases might rarely
114 See note 85 supra.
115 See notes 74 & 79 supra.
116 In the context of psychiatric predictions of violent behavior prior to civil com-
mitment, Professor Dershowitz' thorough survey of the relevant literature strongly sug-
gested that
psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors; inaccurate in an absolute sense,
and even less accurate when compared with other professionals, such as
psychologists, social workers and correctional officials, and when compared to
actuarial devices, such as prediction or experience tables. Even more significant
for legal purposes: it seems that psychiatrists are particularly prone to one type
of error-overprediction. In other words, they tend to predict antisocial con-
duct in many instances where it would not, in fact, occur.
Dershowitz, supra note 74, at 46. See also Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption
of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974). A Pennsylvania
court recently observed, in the context of civil commitment, that "[i]n light of the diffi-
culty of predicting that a given mental state is likely to result in future antisocial con-
duct, it seems necessary to require the commission of some overt act." Commonwealth
ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 183, 339 A.2d 764, 778-79 (1975).
117 For example, in Sigel Estate, 169 Pa. Super. 25, 82 A.2d 309 (1951), aff'd, 381
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arise, a petitioner might nonetheless be tempted to allege all
three grounds to triple his chances of success. If the statute were
truly "protective" in nature that result would be desirable; but
because, in fact, the statute presents a very serious threat to
personal liberty, its scope should be narrowed, not widened,
'18
wherever the choice reasonably arises.'1 9
C. Extrastatutory Factors Influencing the
Determination of Incompetency
Several factors, for the most part not tied to any explicit
statutory language, are often given as much weight by the courts
as the express statutory standards. These factors should be
analyzed to see if they are of positive value. Factors that are of
value should be clearly articulated by the courts or included in
the statute, so that they may be uniformly and predictably ap-
plied; those that are not of positive value should be disregarded
by courts making incompetency decisions.
1. Judicially Imposed Standards
One of these factors is the question of consent by the subject
of the incompetency declaration. Pennsylvania law apparently
does not provide for the appointment of a guardian solely upon
request that a guardian be appointed. At least one court, how-
ever, has considered the subject's consent a strong factor in the
Pa. 603, 114 A.2d 117 (1955), the only effect found was the likelihood that the subject
would become the victim of designing persons. See text accompanying notes 66-68
supra.
118 It is worthy of note that the origin of this statutory language in Pennsylvania
was in an 1895 statute which provided that a guardian of the estate might be appointed
whenever hereafter any person ...shall become or be so weak in mind, that
he or she is utterly unable to take care of his or her property and is therefore
liable to dissipate or lose the same and to become the victim of designing per-
sons ....
Act No. 220, § 1, [1895] Pa. Laws 300 (repealed 1907) (emphasis supplied). It thus
appears that the legislature in 1895 did not intend the dissipation or victimization pro-
visions to be separate grounds, but, rather, to be additional, necessary grounds for a
finding of a need for guardianship. Some courts have followed the older formulation:
Every day normal people are dissipating their property and every day normal
people are the victims of designing persons but it is only in cases where per-
sons are suffering from some mental disease or disorder and by reason of this
infirmity are rendered incompetent to handle their property that the courts
may step in and preserve their estates for their own good.
In re Aronson, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 638, 639 (Montgomery County C.P. 1954).
1i9 The statutory revision proposed by this Comment, set forth in note 151 infra,
deletes likelihood of dissipation or victimization as "effects" permitting an adjudication
of incompetency.
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decision to impose the guardianship. 120 Consent would appear to
be particularly relevant in some cases, for example when a per-
son suffering from only a physical disability wants a guard-
ian appointed. By taking into account the subject's consent,
guardianship can be made more widely available to those who
want it without making involuntary guardianship a threat to
those for whom it is not absolutely necessary. 12 1 The statutory
standard of incompetence should be amended to provide that
physically disabled persons may have guardians appointed if
they consent.'
22
Another factor is the identity and interest of the petitioner
for the declaration of incompetency. Petitions have too often
been motivated by personal greed.' 2 3 In Mulholland's Estate12 4 the
court noted that "the relationship of the petitioner not only to
the accused but to the accused's property, with a view to the
uncovering of any secret or selfish motive in the proceedings
should always be ma.de a specific point for the keenest and most
searching judicial inquiry."'1 25 Although the current statute does
provide that "[t]he court may dismiss a proceeding where it finds
as a fact that the proceeding has not been instituted to aid or
benefit the alleged incompetent,"' 2 6 its language is not strong
enough to respond adequately to the real danger of proceedings
brought by interested petitioners. One solution would be to re-
quire an affirmative finding of fact that the proceeding was insti-
tuted for the good of the alleged incompetent. 27 A finding of
improper motivation should not, of itself, require that the peti-
tion be dismissed; but in such a case the petition should be
120 See DuPuy Estate, 167 Pa. Super. 328, 74 A.2d 804 (1950).
121 See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
1 2 This suggested amendment is incorporated into the statutory revision set forth
in note 151 infra.
123 One court has noted "numerous instances where children have brought pro-
ceedings against an elderly surviving parent in order to compel distribution of the
latter's property in accordance with the Intestate Laws rather than the desires of the
parent." Axe Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 625, 628 (Phila. County Orphans' Ct. 1964). For
other examples of improperly motivated petitions, see Denner v. Beyer, 352 Pa. 386,
388, 42 A.2d 747, 748 (1945); Mulholland's Estate, 217 Pa. 65, 68, 66 A. 150, 151
(1907); Bryden's Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 637, 61 A. 250, 251 (1905); Hudak Appeal, 170
Pa. Super. 74, 76, 84 A.2d 226, 227 (1951); Owens Appeal, 167 Pa. Super. 10, 12, 74
A.2d 705, 706 (1950); In re Brinton, 86 Pa. Super. 194, 198 (1925); Lancaster Estate, 13
Bucks County L. Rptr. 312, 321 (Orphans' Ct. 1963).
124 217 Pa. 65, 66 A. 150 (1907).
125 Id. at 68, 66 A. at 151.
126 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5511 (a) (1975).
127 For other solutions to this problem see Alexander, Surrogate Management of the
Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 167-68 (1969); Regan, supra note 5, at 616.
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granted only if it clearly appears that the guardianship will be in
the best interest of the prospective ward.
128
2. Burden of Proof
A third extrastatutory consideration is procedural due pro-
cess, particularly burden of proof. The Pennsylvania courts have
not moved very far in this direction, but the use of the word
"accused" by the court in Mulholland's Estate129 may suggest that
one court, at least, was aware of the analogy to criminal proceed-
ings and of the need for strict protection of the procedural
rights of the alleged incompetent.
This awareness has been more apparent in the related area
of involuntary civil commitment of mentally disturbed persons.
Two landmark cases of the 1970's, Lessard v. Schmidt130 and In re
Ballay,"3 have forcefully pointed out the need for strict stan-
dards of due process in such proceedings. A recent Pennsylvania
decision, Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop,' 32 in which the
court reversed a commitment order because of procedural de-
ficiencies, addressed the analogy to criminal proceedings. The
court's opinion noted that "involuntary commitment involves the
same fundamental liberty that is at stake in criminal proceed-
ings: the right of every individual to be unimpeded in the con-
duct of his affairs .... -133 Stating that the commitment statute
operates "for the benefit of" the person committed "is actually
only another formulation of the parens patriae argument" and
does not lessen the requirements of due process, the court de-
clared. "The serious deprivation of liberty and the unfortunate
stigma which follow involuntary commitment render the distinc-
tion between 'criminal' and 'civil' proceedings meaningless.
'134
Although civil commitment and involuntary guardianship
proceedings cannot be equated for all purposes, they share the
elements of stigma and significant restraint on the freedom to
conduct one's affairs. Recognizing the force of this analogy could
lead to a stricter burden of proof in guardianship proceedings.
In proceedings for adjudications of competency, the Penn-
128 This suggestion is incorporated into the proposed statutory revision set forth in
note 151 infra.
129 Text accompanying note 125 supra.
"0 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
'3' 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975).
12 Id. at 168-69, 339 A.2d at 771 (footnote omitted) (only three of seven judges
joined in this part of the opinion).13 4 Id. at 171-72, 339 A.2d at 772-73.
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sylvania courts generally require that "the burden of proof of
establishing competency [be] by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence ... .,,t35 Although the language of some opinions suggests
that the burden in proceedings for declarations of incompetency
is heavier, 36 it is not clear that the courts have, in fact, de-
manded more than a preponderance.137 If the logic and lan-
guage of Finken were followed, the courts would require peti-
tioners in incompetency cases to meet at least the standard of
"clear, unequivocal and convincing" proof. 38 Such a burden of
proof would help safeguard the alleged incompetent's rights and
should deter the bringing of frivolous petitions. 139
3. Judicial Attitudes and Tendencies
The Pennsylvania courts too often appear prone to "err on
the safe side," and to let unwarranted guardianships stand.
40
Implicit in this practice, of course, is the misconception that
guardianship is "safe," a benevolent, protective institution that
can do no harm. Although the statute permitting appointment
of a guardian has often been called "preventative and protective
in nature,"' 41 some courts have apparently concluded that, in-
135 See Nagle Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 172, 210 A.2d 262, 264 (1965).
136 The supreme court observed in a footnote in In re Estate of Porter, 345 A.2d
171, 174 (Pa. 1975) (quoting Myers Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 462-63, 150 A.2d 525, 527
(1959)), that the burden requires "evidence [that] is preponderating and points uner-
ringly to mental incompetency." It should be noted that neither Myers nor Porter turned
on the burden-of-proof issue.
137 See generally Coulter Estate, 406 Pa. 402, 178 A.2d 742 (1962).
138 234 Pa. Super. at 175, 339 A.2d at 774 (only three of seven judges joined in this
part of the opinion).
The proposed statutory revision set forth in note 151 infra adopts this higher bur-
den of proof standard.
' A comment on the Ballay standard noted that "[s]trict requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt may help to winnow the meaningless from the classifications
and forge a new and more accurate statutory language." 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 751, 758
(1973).
140 Justice Musmanno, dissenting from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to
reverse a trial court's denial of a petition for restoration to competency, noted:
One sure way not to make a mistake is not to do anything. Thus, the [trial
court] ... handling the present case can remain safely within its ivory tower of
non-criticism by refusing to touch the status quo .... The court below may
have felt that if it was erring, it was doing so on the safe side ....
Pearlman Appeal, 400 Pa. 350, 352-53, 163 A.2d 530, 531 (1960) (Musmanno, J., dis-
senting). Justice Musmanno's criticism of the majority opinion seems to stem from the
tendency of appellate courts in estate guardianship cases too readily to exercise their
traditional deference to the factual determinations of trial courts. See, e.g., Coulter Es-
tate, 406 Pa. 402, 413, 178 A.2d 742, 748 (1962). A stricter burden of proof would tend
to counteract any such tendency to defer too willingly to trial court findings in this
difficult and sensitive area.
141 See note 9 supra.
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stead of serving as a warning not to declare a person incompe-
tent unless he will really be protected, and some concrete harm
prevented, the "preventative and protective" label is an indica-
tion that guardianship is always preventative and protective, and,
therefore, less caution than normal is called for in applying the
statute.142 For example, in Card Appeal,1 43 where the court dis-
missed on procedural grounds an appeal from a finding of in-
competency, the court noted in passing that "[i]n the meantime,
in view of the unfortunate contest between daughters for con-
trol of the estate of their aged and ailing mother, it is not amiss
that the mother's assets are in the hands of a competent corpo-
rate fiduciary. 1 44 Although the court may have been powerless
to terminate the guardianship in this case,1 45 its language indi-
cates a readiness to allow interference with the subject's freedom
of choice in her property affairs.1 46 That it may not be "amiss"
142 For a criticism of the tendency of the law to make mistaken predictions ("false
positives") in situations where one is being "protected" (or society is being protected)
against future deviant behavior, see von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Pre-
ventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 731 (1972): "In the con-
text of ... preventive incarceration, we can afford little tolerance, indeed, of prediction
methods that show a high yield of false positives. Here, mistakenly predicting non-
dangerous individuals to be dangerous is gravely damaging-for it can lead to their
prolonged incarceration." This argument applies also to guardianship cases. See text
accompanying notes 132-38 supra.
143 177 Pa. Super. 502, 110 A.2d 856 (1955).
144 Id. at 506, 110 A.2d at 857.
145 The appeal was dismissed as not timely, Id. at 505, 110 A.2d at 857.
146 Two recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, despite some expan-
sive language, probably do not signify a departure from the approach to the statute
typified by the cases discussed above.
In Urquhart Estate, 431 Pa. 134, 245 A.2d 141 (1968), the court reversed the or-
phans' court's order dismissing a petition for return to competency, noting that "no one
should be deprived of dominion over his own property except for monumental reasons
which include harm to the owner or to the property itself or to society in general." Id.
at 135, 245 A.2d at 142. This statement will not solve many problems in this area of
law, sweeping as it may seem at first glance. The court did not stop at "harm to the
owner," as it should have, see text accompanying notes 106-12 supra, but went on to
include harm to the property and to society in general. These latter two categories are
broad enough to cover virtually any behavior that conflicts with a court's view of sound
property management. Any large expenditure of principal could be said to "harm the
property." "Society in general" could include prospective heirs, who are "harmed," ar-
guably, if their inheritance is cut down. Furthermore, the court in Urquhart did not base
its decision on the absence of "monumental reasons." It found "not the slightest evi-
dence in all this litigation to suggest that Urquhart's property may be dissipated or that
he may be the victim of designing persons." 431 Pa. at 136, 245 A.2d at 142. The court
properly concluded that the lower court's decision went against the weight of the evi-
dence. The court did not, as its dictum may suggest, ground its decision on the lack of
potential harm to petitioner or others.
More recently, in In re Estate of Porter, 345 A.2d 171 (Pa. 1975), the court re-
versed another denial of a petition for an adjudication of competency, emphasizing that
"a guardianship may not be created, or continued, merely because the person lacks the
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that the assets are under a guardian's control is not the point; in-
voluntary guardianship, no matter how desirable, is not justified
unless strict standards of incompetency are met.
147
Related to some courts' view of the statute as benign and
harmless is their attitude toward the alleged incompetents. Often
the courts seem quite paternalistic in their discussion of the foi-
bles of eccentric individuals. 148 Similarly, courts at times are
given to substituting their own business judgment for that of the
alleged incompetent. Their disapproval of his behavior may be a
weighty factor in the adjudication of incompetence, even though
the behavior may have been well within the proper statutory
limits of competence. 149 Aside from the impact of such intrusive
attitudes or findings of incompetency, the danger that courts will
seize upon unwise, unpleasant, or eccentric behavior as evidence
of incompetence may cause some persons to shy away from be-
havior that does not clearly conform to societal norms. 150
ability or experience needed to manage large sums of money." Id. at 173. The court
noted that guardianship may be imposed only if the statutory standards are met. It also
stated in a footnote that the burden for an initial adjudication of incompetency is
heavier than that for an adjudication of competency, requiring proof that is "prepon-
derating and points unerringly to mental incompetency." Id. at 174 n.6. But see note 136
supra & accompanying text. That statement of the burden of proof may be an en-
couraging sign, but, because the court did not announce this formulation as increasing
the burden which had been used in the past, the stricter language may represent a
reaction to the circumstances of the case.
In general, it is doubtful that these decisions herald a new sensitivity to the rights
of an alleged incompetent. The petitioner in Porter had been adjudged incompetent in
1926, forty-nine years before the decision, on the ground that he was an epileptic. At the
1974 hearing on his petition to terminate the incompetency, "three well-qualified ex-
perts testified that appellant is competent, and their testimony was uncontradicted." Id.
at 174. These facts, like those of Urquhart, do not present the closer questions that
sometimes cause courts to make questionable findings of incompetency. However, Ur-
quhart and Porter do suggest that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court now recognizes that
inertia should not influence the decision with respect to a termination petition, and that
the statutory standard of incompetency must be adhered to, at least in cases where it
has clearly not been met.
,47 The need for courts to separate questions of justification and desirability is dis-
cussed in Comment, Adequacy of Mental Examination in Guardianship Proceedings, 25 OHIO
ST. L.J. 307, 308-09 (1964). The author concludes that a trial court's discretion should
extend only to the desirability of guardianship, and that a finding of incompetency
according to the statutory definition should be a prerequisite to the exercise of that
discretion.
148 See, e.g., Nagle Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 172, 210 A.2d 262, 263-64 (1965); Shepherd
Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 712 (Delaware County C.P. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 391 Pa.
102, 137 A.2d 298 (1958); In re Guzzi's Estate, 50 Lackawanna Jur. 139, 140 (C.P. 1948).
149 In Shepherd Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 712 (Delaware County C.P. 1956), aff'd
per curiam, 391 Pa. 102, 137 A.2d 298 (1955), the court noted that its decision to impose
a guardianship was influenced by the alleged incompetent's having "entered into what
in our judgment was an irresponsible and improvident agreement." Id. at 720.
,5
0
See note 14 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A declaration of civil incompetency resulting in a guardian-
ship of the estate is a very serious matter, having drastic legal,
social, and psychological effects for a person declared incompe-
tent. Accordingly, such a declaration should be granted only as a
last resort, when no other remedy is available. When an adjudi-
cation of incompetency is sought, the courts should abandon the
myth that such proceedings are "preventative and protective,"
and should grant the petition only when strict justification is
shown, in the absence of consent by the alleged incompetent.
The current Pennsylvania incompetency statute is designed
to include within its reach as many persons who might benefit
from guardianship as possible. That broad reach should be pre-
served for persons who desire, and will consent to, the. appoint-
ment of a guardian. For unconsented guardianships, however,
the statute should require a sufficient finding of mental distur-
bance to justify state interference with personal freedom; it
should require that there be no effective alternative to guardian-
ship; and it should require a finding of actual hardship resulting
from inability to manage property, rather than a mere likelihood
of dissipation of the estate or victimization by designing persons.
The statute should also impose a stricter burden of proof on
the petitioner for an unconsented declaration of incompetency,
and a lighter burden on the petitioner for termination of
incompetency. 151
151 The following proposed revision of sections 5501 and 5511 of the Decedents,
Estates and Fiduciaries Code, PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5501, 5511 (1975),
incorporates the changes recommended in this Comment.
§ 5501. Meaning of Disabled Person
"Disabled person" means a person who, because of mental or physical in-
firmities, mental illness, or mental deficiency:
(1) is unable to manage his property; or
(2) lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions
concerning his person.
§ 5511. Petition and hearing; examination by court-appointed physician
(a) Resident.-
(1) The court, upon petition and a hearing may, upon clear, un-
equivocal, and convincing proof, find a person domiciled in the
Commonwealth to be disabled and appoint a guardian or guardians of
his person or estate: Provided that no person's estate shall be placed
under guardianship without his consent unless at the time of the hear-
ing as a result of mental infirmities, mental illness, or mental defi-
ciency he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the harmful
character of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of his own well-being; And provided further that no person's es-
tate shall be placed under guardianship without his consent unless his
inability to manage his property is of such a nature and degree that
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The attitude of the Pennsylvania courts has tended to favor
paternalistic interference with alleged incompetents' manage-
ment of their own property. It would be a far better approach
for the lawmakers and judges to leave individuals free to make
their own mistakes, absent an overriding need for state interven-
tion to prevent a personal catastrophe.
substantial harm will befall him as a direct result of such inability and
unless no other suitable property management arrangement to which
he will consent is available.
(2) The petitioner may be any person interested in the alleged dis-
abled person's welfare. The court shall dismiss a proceeding unless it
finds that the proceeding was instituted to aid or benefit the alleged
incompetent or that, despite the proceeding not having been instituted
to aid or benefit the alleged disabled person, it clearly appears that
the guardianship will be in the best interest of the prospective ward.
Notice of the petition and hearing shall be given in such manner as
the court shall direct to the alleged disabled person, to all persons
residing within the Commonwealth who are sui juris and would be
entitled to share in the estate of the alleged disabled person if he died
intestate at that time, and to such other parties as the court may di-
rect. The hearing may be closed to the public and without a jury un-
less the alleged disabled person or his counsel objects. The hearing
shall be closed and with or without a jury if the person alleged to be
disabled or his counsel so requests. The alleged disabled person shall
be present at the hearing unless:
(a) the court is satisfied, upon the presentation of positive tes-
timony, that because of his physical or mental condition his wel-
fare would not be promoted by his presence; or
(b) it is impossible for him to be present because of his absence
from the Commonwealth. It shall not be necessary for the alleged
disabled person to be represented by a guardian ad litem in the
proceeding.
(b) Nonresident.-The court may find a person not domiciled in the
Commonwealth, having property in the Commonwealth, to be disabled
and may appoint a guardian of his estate. The appointment may be in the
manner provided in subsection (a) of this section, or upon the submission
of an exemplified copy of a decree establishing his incompetency in
another jurisdiction. The court shall give preference in its appointment to
the foreign guardian of the nonresident disabled person, unless it finds
that such appointment will not be for the best interests of the disabled
person.
(c) Court-appointed physician.-Upon the filing of a petition the alleged
disabled person may be examined by a physician appointed by the court
who shall submit his report in writing to the court and to the parties be-
fore the hearing.
Substitution of "disabled person" for "incompetent" in the present statute would also,
of course, require technical conforming amendments throughout chapter 55 of the
Code.
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